Counting Again
| Autor: | David Sanson, Ben Caplan, Cathleen Muller |
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| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Grazer Philosophische Studien. 94:69-82 |
| ISSN: | 1875-6735 0165-9227 |
| Popis: | The authors consider a recurring objection to fictional realism, the view that (broadly speaking) fictional characters are objects. The authors call this the counting objection. Russell presses a version of the objection against Meinong’s view. Everett presses a version of the objection against contemporary fictional realist views, as (in effect) do Nolan and Sandgren. As the authors see it, the objection assumes that the fictional realist must provide criteria of identity for fictional characters, so its force depends on the plausibility of that assumption. Rather than coming up with such criteria, a fictional realist might argue that the demand is misplaced. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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