Do Informal Contracts Matter for Corporate Innovation? Evidence from Social Capital
Autor: | Kartik Raman, Atul Gupta, Chenguang Shang |
---|---|
Rok vydání: | 2019 |
Předmět: | |
Zdroj: | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 55:1657-1684 |
ISSN: | 1756-6916 0022-1090 |
DOI: | 10.1017/s0022109019000498 |
Popis: | We examine the relevance of informal contracting mechanisms for corporate innovation. Using social capital to capture the social costs imposed on opportunistic behavior by management, we report evidence that firms headquartered in states with higher levels of social capital are associated with more innovation. This result is more pronounced when employees are more susceptible to holdup (e.g., firms with low labor union coverage, firms located in states with weak legal protections for employees, and firms surrounded by few external employment opportunities) and when employees face higher levels of information asymmetry. Our study highlights the importance of informal contracts for innovation. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
Externí odkaz: |