Power Indices in the European Union

Autor:	Flavio Pressacco
Rok vydání:	2004
Předmět:	education.field_of_study Public economics Population Numerosity adaptation effect Development Power (social and political) Chart European integration Economics media_common.cataloged_instance European union Treaty education Game theory Mathematical economics media_common
Zdroj:	Transition Studies Review. 11:95-113
ISSN:	1614-4015 1614-4007
DOI:	10.1007/s11300-004-0007-y
Popis:	We analyze the power of the countries in the decisional mechanism of the European Council along an evolutionary path from the old conventional votes mechanism prevailing in the 15-countries European Union via the rules defined in the Nice treaty for various possible enlargements to the future decisional rules defined in the Constitutional Chart, which will become effective from 2009. The theoretical tools applied are the power indices of Banzhaf and Coleman and Shapley and Shubik within the frame of the multicriteria-weighted-majority games. The results unequivocally show a path moving from a power transfer from the more to the less populated countries toward a country power corresponding to the population numerosity.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7b8aec215c04d7b5b61a7845856c2dfc https://doi.org/10.1007/s11300-004-0007-y Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink