The evolution of cooperation in mixed games

Autor: Jafferson K. L. da Silva, Lucas Wardil
Rok vydání: 2013
Předmět:
Zdroj: Chaos, Solitons & Fractals. 56:160-165
ISSN: 0960-0779
DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.018
Popis: Cooperation has been studied in the context of game evolutionary theory by assuming that individuals play always the same game. Here we consider a mixture of two games G 1 and G 2 . In each interaction of two individuals, they can play the games G 1 or G 2 with probabilities w and 1 - w , respectively. We define the evolutionary model and study the cooperation evolution in a well-mixed population and in a cycle. We show that in the well-mixed population the evolution is equivalent to the evolution given by the average game. In a cycle, we show that the intensity of selection plays an important role in the promotion or inhibition of cooperation, depending on the games that are mixed.
Databáze: OpenAIRE