Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: Accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games
| Autor: | Alvin E. Roth, Ido Erev, Greg Barron, Robert Slonim |
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| Rok vydání: | 2007 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Economic Theory. 33:29-51 |
| ISSN: | 1432-0479 0938-2259 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00199-007-0214-y |
| Popis: | There is a good deal of miscommunication among experimenters and theorists about how to evaluate a theory that can be rejected by sufficient data, but may nevertheless be a useful approximation. A standard experimental design reports whether a general theory can be rejected on an informative test case. This paper, in contrast, reports an experiment designed to meaningfully pose the ques- tion: "how good an approximation does a theory provide on average." It focuses on a class of randomly selected games, and estimates how many pairs of experimental subjects would have to be observed playing a previously unexamined game before the mean of the experimental observations would provide a better prediction than the theory about the behavior of a new pair of subjects playing this game. We call this quantity the model's equivalent number of observations, and explore its properties. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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