Peirce on facts, propositions, and the index
| Autor: | Richard Kenneth Atkins |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
050101 languages & linguistics
Linguistics and Language Index (economics) Literature and Literary Theory Philosophy 060302 philosophy 05 social sciences 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Mathematical economics Language and Linguistics |
| Zdroj: | Semiotica. 2019:17-28 |
| ISSN: | 1613-3692 |
| DOI: | 10.1515/sem-2018-0082 |
| Popis: | Peirce holds that our logic should be the basis for our metaphysics. He also thinks that facts and propositions are structurally isomorphic. However, unlike many theorists who take propositions such as snow is white and grass is green as their paradigmatic examples, Peirce takes it rains (Latin: pleurit) and similar propositions as his paradigmatic examples. I explore how his analysis of such propositions and the way in which they convey meaning becomes more complex from 1895 to 1909, how this impacts his metaphysics, and how he can claim that something like the common environment of two interlocutors can itself be an index. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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