Ultimate parent board reform and corporate overinvestment: a quasi‐natural experiment study
| Autor: | Yamin Zeng, Sujuan Xie, Junsheng Zhang, Yue Xu |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
040101 forestry
Government 050208 finance Natural experiment media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) Subsidiary Financial system 04 agricultural and veterinary sciences Investment policy Incentive State (polity) Shareholder Accounting 0502 economics and business Top management 0401 agriculture forestry and fisheries Business Finance media_common |
| Zdroj: | Accounting & Finance. |
| ISSN: | 1467-629X 0810-5391 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/acfi.12443 |
| Popis: | Using government‐led board reform as a quasi‐natural experiment, we find that board reform at Chinese state controlling shareholders significantly alleviates overinvestment at their listed subsidiaries. The positive role of board reform in reducing overinvestment is stronger when state controlling shareholders have weak incentive to expropriate listed subsidiaries, or they can better monitor the listed subsidiaries through assigned top management. Furthermore, we find that board reform further reduces managerial cost at their listed subsidiaries. Overall, our findings suggest that government‐led board reform enhances internal governance at state controlling shareholders and has a positive effect on investment policy at their listed subsidiaries. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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