On the incentive effects of job rotation
| Autor: | Svetlana Katolnik, Hendrik Hakenes |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Discounting ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Perfect information Time horizon Rule of thumb Learning-by-doing (economics) Microeconomics Incentive 0502 economics and business Economics Job rotation 050207 economics Finance 050205 econometrics Reputation media_common |
| Zdroj: | European Economic Review. 98:424-441 |
| ISSN: | 0014-2921 |
| Popis: | A new employee may work hard to build his reputation. This effect is greatest when he starts. The longer he is employed at his job, the more the firm will already have learned about his ability. The incentives for an employee to influence the firm’s perceptions of his ability decrease over time. If rotating the employee to a different job leads to new uncertainty about his ability, this generates a fresh impulse for effort. However, job rotation also reduces the employee’s time horizon, thus reducing future rents from reputation. This trade-off leads to a unique optimum. We derive a simple rule of thumb for an optimal rotation time. Our main results still hold for cases of complete but imperfect information transmission. The incentive effects of job rotation also prevail in a setting in which skills are job-specific. We study several extensions: rotations across multiple employees, absence of commitment to a rotation time, different bargaining positions, discounting over time, and learning by doing effects. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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