Future Contingents, Branching time and Assertion
| Autor: | Alessio Santelli |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of science Philosophy 05 social sciences Assertion 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Indeterminism 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Branching (linguistics) Philosophy of language 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences |
| Zdroj: | Philosophia. 49:777-799 |
| ISSN: | 1574-9274 0048-3893 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11406-020-00235-0 |
| Popis: | According to an influential line of thought, from the assumption that indeterminism makes future contingents neither true nor false, one can conclude that assertions of future contingents are never permissible. This conclusion, however, fails to recognize that we ordinarily assert future contingents even when we take the future to be unsettled. Several attempts have been made to solve this puzzle, either by arguing that, albeit truth-valueless, future contingents can be correctly assertable, or by rejecting the claim that future contingents are truth-valueless. The paper examines three of most representative accounts in line with the first attempt, and concludes that none of them succeed in providing a persuasive answer as to why we felicitously assert future contingents. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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