Protecting Nuclear Safeguards Monitoring Data from Tampering

Autor:	Jon S. Warner, Michael J. Timmons, Roger G. Johnston
Rok vydání:	2007
Předmět:	Computer science business.industry Substitution cipher General Engineering ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Context (language use) Adversary Computer security computer.software_genre Encryption Cipher Nuclear safeguards Keypad Treaty business computer
Zdroj:	Science & Global Security. 15:185-209
ISSN:	1547-7800 0892-9882
DOI:	10.1080/08929880701715076
Popis:	Effective treaty monitoring requires that nuclear monitoring data be safe from tampering. Tamper-indicating seals and standard data encryption/integrity techniques, however, do not provide sufficient security, especially against electronic and physical attacks in the context of international nuclear safeguards. This article presents an alternative approach for assuring the integrity of monitoring data called the “One-Time Pad of Digits Substitutions” (OPODS). This cipher is a combination of the unbreakable one-time keypad, and the traditional substitution cipher. OPODS provides unbreakable security prior to an adversary trespassing inside nuclear monitoring hardware (even if the trespassing goes undetected), and good security after.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::75acfaf572badc32d5953f59c6504378 https://doi.org/10.1080/08929880701715076 Zobrazit plný text záznamu