Information and Diagrammatic Reasoning: An Inferentialist Reading
Autor: | Bruno Ramos Mendonça |
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Rok vydání: | 2020 |
Předmět: |
Philosophy of science
Interpretation (logic) Philosophy of information Computer science media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Object (philosophy) 050105 experimental psychology Veridicality Epistemology Philosophy Diagrammatic reasoning Artificial Intelligence Reading (process) 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Set (psychology) media_common |
Zdroj: | Minds and Machines. 31:99-120 |
ISSN: | 1572-8641 0924-6495 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11023-020-09547-2 |
Popis: | In current philosophy of information, different authors have been supporting the veridicality thesis (VT). According to this thesis, an epistemically-oriented concept of information must have truth as one of its necessary conditions. Two challenges can be raised against VT. First, some philosophers object that veridicalists erroneously ignore the informativeness of false messages. Secondly, it is not clear whether VT can adequately explain the information considered in hypothetical reasoning. In this sense, logical diagrams offer an interesting case of analysis: by manipulating a logical diagram we can verify that a certain conclusion follows from a set of premises, but it cannot help us to determine the actual truth-value of a given set of propositions. Focusing on the latter challenge, in this paper I claim that logical diagrams set out potential counterexamples to VT and, consequently, pose a real challenge to this thesis. First, a veridicalist analysis of logical diagrams requires the assumption of metatheoretical properties which are not satisfied by some logical systems (and, consequently, are not satisfied by some systems of logical diagrams). So, VT does not fit well as a general framework for a theory of logical diagrammatic information. Secondly, based on semantic inferentialism, one can propose a normative interpretation of the inferential content of logical diagrams not exposed to the problems faced by VT. Moreover, there are several reasons to believe that veridicalism cannot accommodate such a normative interpretation. In other words, normativism represents a real (though still underexplored) alternative to veridicality. Due to these reasons, I conclude that, until further research, we should adopt a more parsimonious standpoint and say that logical diagrams provide inferential information simply. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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