A proportional value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
| Autor: | Frank Huettner |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2014 |
| Předmět: |
Mathematical optimization
Property (philosophy) Structure (category theory) General Social Sciences General Decision Sciences Extension (predicate logic) Shapley value Computer Science Applications Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous) Consistency (statistics) Developmental and Educational Psychology Economics Solution concept Transferable utility General Economics Econometrics and Finance Value (mathematics) Mathematical economics Applied Psychology |
| Zdroj: | Theory and Decision. 78:273-287 |
| ISSN: | 1573-7187 0040-5833 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11238-014-9420-9 |
| Popis: | We introduce a solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility and a coalition structure that is proportional for two-player games. Our value is obtained from generalizing a proportional value for cooperative games with transferable utility (Ortmann 2000) in a way that parallels the extension of the Shapley value to the Owen value. We provide two characterizations of our solution concept, one that employs a property that can be seen as the proportional analog to Myerson’s balanced contribution property; and a second one that relies on a consistency property. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full text from SpringerLink