Some Notes on Cournot and the Bargaining Problem

Autor:	Marc Nerlove
Rok vydání:	2017
Předmět:	Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Symmetric equilibrium Cournot competition Microeconomics Bertrand paradox (economics) symbols.namesake Equilibrium selection Nash equilibrium Bertrand competition Economics Stackelberg competition symbols Epsilon-equilibrium Mathematical economics
DOI:	10.1108/s0743-41542017000035a009
Popis:	The basic ideas of Cournot and those who came after him are related to the recent work of Nash and his notion of an “equilibrium point.” It is shown that the Nash equilibrium point incorporates the main contribution of Cournot to the solution of the duopoly problem and that the major criticism that may be made against the Cournot equilibrium may also be made against the Nash equilibrium. It is then indicated to what use this weakness might be put in the study of bargaining.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::73c8b1991d60992508d4c4ed4ebd0286 https://doi.org/10.1108/s0743-41542017000035a009 Zobrazit plný text záznamu