Can you keep a secret? Increasing speakers’ motivation to keep information confidential yields poorer outcomes
Autor: | Michael J. Liersch, Liane Wardlow Lane |
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Rok vydání: | 2012 |
Předmět: | |
Zdroj: | Language and Cognitive Processes. 27:462-473 |
ISSN: | 1464-0732 0169-0965 |
DOI: | 10.1080/01690965.2011.556348 |
Popis: | Attempts to keep confidential information from being revealed can ironically increase the likelihood of its revelation. We ask whether increasing speakers’ motivation to avoid revealing confidential information, through the use of a monetary incentive, helps them overcome their tendency to do so. Data showed that speakers were most likely to reveal confidential information after receiving an instruction and monetary incentive to avoid doing so. Speakers’ increased revelations occurred despite the fact that their partners were able to capitalize on this information to the detriment of speakers’ outcomes. We argue that unintended revelations of confidential information occur due to cognitive processes that are largely beyond speakers’ control. These processes likely work to speakers’ benefits in many circumstances, but they also lead to systematic errors that speakers have difficulty correcting. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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