Dewey's Metaphysics of Mind
| Autor: | Mendonça, Wilson |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | němčina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| DOI: | 10.24338/abs-2007.319 |
| Popis: | In Experience and Nature Dewey makes “an attempt to contribute to what has come to be called an ‘emergent’ theory of mind”. On a first approach, that doesn’t look very innovative to our contemporary materialist convictions. Indeed, Kim argues persuasively that a central claim of emergentism—concerning the irreducibility of emergent properties—is irremediably at odds with a view of mental causation that follows from some very plausible physicalist assumptions. This is “the problem of downward causation.” I intend to show that Dewey’s brand of emergentism actually allows an adequate reply to the very important worry formulated by Kim. a, Bd. 3 Nr. 2 (2007) |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|