| Popis: |
Some prominent cognitive theories have adopted an intriguing idea from metaphysics: The conditions of identity and individuation of objects come from the meaning of sortal nouns—count nouns, such as “dog” or “cup.” According to this sortalist theory, Rover’s identity over time and his distinctness from Fido depend on the meaning of “dog.” This chapter first describes the sortalist view in metaphysics (section 11.1) and then traces the ways in which cognitive psychologists have adapted and modified this theory in an attempt to explain empirical data—people’s judgments about the nature of objects (section 11.2). Sections 11.3 and 11.4 then examine some recent work in philosophy and psychology, arguing that these findings raise two related, but distinct, worries for sortalism as a psychological theory (which is here called psychosortalism). Finally, section 11.5 assesses whether any of the original metaphysics can survive within the best cognitive theories of object concepts. |
