Screening of possibly incompetent agents

Autor:	Philip H. Dybvig, Nina Baranchuk
Rok vydání:	2015
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Risk analysis (engineering) Computer science High ability Principal (computer security) Operations management Sensitivity (electronics) Finance
Zdroj:	Economics Letters. 135:15-18
ISSN:	0165-1765
Popis:	Accepting a contract with a high performance sensitivity is normally interpreted as a signal of high ability. However, a high self-assessment may be an incompetent forecast by an incompetent worker. In a model where optimistic agents have low ability, a low performance sensitivity screens out the incompetent agents. However, when agents are wealthy enough, the principal prefers to select the incompetent agent who covers the downside (as in a vanity press).
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7292ce94c37530097f4b33f1ac4135ed https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.07.016 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full Text from ScienceDirect