SA–Based PMU Network Upgrade for Detectability of GPS Spoofing Attacks
| Autor: | Morteza Sarailoo, N. Eva Wu, John S. Bay |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
021110 strategic
defence & security studies Spoofing attack Transmission (telecommunications) Computer science 020209 energy Assisted GPS Real-time computing 0211 other engineering and technologies 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering 02 engineering and technology Isolation (database systems) Partition (database) |
| Zdroj: | 2019 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM). |
| DOI: | 10.1109/pesgm40551.2019.8973393 |
| Popis: | Synchrophasor availability-based (SA–based) optimal PMU placement [1] has been developed to meet any specified long-run data availability profile across all buses in a power system in addition to providing synchrophasor observability, despite, for example, communication interruptions. In this paper, we impose a local detectability condition to the SA–based PMU placement problem to ensure that the resulting placement can also detect a GPS spoofing attack on any PMU using only a partial transmission circuit bordered by some PMUs, including the attacked PMU. The partial circuit is called a partition resulting from the application of a partition algorithm reported in [2] specific to the placement solution. Upon placement and partition, the performance of a proposed detection and isolation algorithm of GPS spoofing attacks is evaluated under different attack scenarios for the IEEE 300-bus system, including coordinated attacks, and the results are reported in this work. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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