Coalition Formation in Centralized Policy Games

Autor:	A.M.A. van Deemen
Rok vydání:	1991
Předmět:	Politics Sociology and Political Science Public economics Political system 0502 economics and business 05 social sciences 050602 political science & public administration Opposition (politics) Economics 050207 economics Mathematical economics 0506 political science
Zdroj:	Journal of Theoretical Politics. 3:139-161
ISSN:	1460-3667 0951-6298
DOI:	10.1177/0951692891003002002
Popis:	In this article a theory is presented that deals with the entry of coalitions in political systems. This theory, which is formulated in game theoretical terms, is called the theory of power excess coalitions. It is based on the behavioral assumption that each player strives to form a coalition in which the player can maximally control the internal opposition. Three variations of the theory are presented. The first variation deals with the entry of coalitions in political systems in which policy does not figure. In contrast, in the other two variations, policy positions will play an essential role. A political system will then be modelled as a so-called centralized policy game. In these policy models, the notion of `center' and the related notions of `left' and `right' are basic. The non-policy variation will lead to Riker's minimum size principle (Riker, 1962; Riker and Ordeshook, 1973); the other variations each lead to a modified policy version of this principle.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
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