The Inner Regulation Optimum of the Notarial Profession

Autor:	Helmut Berrer, Christian Helmenstein, Kalpana Scholtes-Dash
Rok vydání:	2017
Předmět:	Microeconomics Competition (economics) Deregulation Information asymmetry media_common.quotation_subject Civil law (legal system) ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Context (language use) Quality (business) Business Outcome (game theory) Externality media_common
Zdroj:	Ius Comparatum-Global Studies in Comparative Law ISBN: 9789402410648
DOI:	10.1007/978-94-024-1066-2_30
Popis:	This paper introduces the concept of an optimal level of regulation to accomplish welfare maximization in the context of civil law notaries. Regulation is generally considered inevitable to ensure the quality of legal services due to the presence of information asymmetries and externalities in the market for legal services. On theoretical and empirical grounds, we find that complete deregulation does not necessarily lead to a welfare-maximizing outcome, nor does it result in increased competition in the long run. Moreover, we specify conditions for an inner solution to achieve the regulatory optimum in an informationally inefficient market.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6b49a69f15246faae441aa7a353a4396 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1066-2_30 Zobrazit plný text záznamu