Oracle-based Logic Locking Attacks: Protect the Oracle Not Only the Netlist
| Autor: | Nikolaos Karousos, E. Kalligeros, Irene G. Karybali |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
010302 applied physics
Scheme (programming language) Focus (computing) Hardware security module business.industry Computer science Process (computing) 02 engineering and technology 01 natural sciences Oracle 020202 computer hardware & architecture 0103 physical sciences 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Key (cryptography) Netlist business computer Computer network computer.programming_language |
| Zdroj: | DATE |
| Popis: | Logic locking has received a lot of attention in the literature due to its very attractive hardware-security characteristics: it can protect against IP piracy and overproduction throughout the whole IC supply chain. However, a large class of logic-locking attacks, the oracle-based ones, take advantage of a functional copy of the chip, the oracle, to extract the key that protects the chip. So far, the techniques dealing with oracle-based attacks focus on the netlist that the attacker possesses, assuming that the oracle is always available. For this reason, they are usually overcome by new attacks. In this paper, we propose a hardware security scheme that targets the protection of the oracle circuit, by locking the circuit when the, necessary for setting the inputs and observing the outputs, scan in/out process begins. Hence, no correct input/output pairs can be acquired to perform the attacks. The proposed scheme is not based on controlling global signals like test_enable or scan_enable, whose values can be easily suppressed by the attacker. Security threats are identified, discussed and addressed. The developed scheme is combined with a traditional logic locking technique with high output corruptibility, to achieve increased levels of protection. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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