The unemployment effect of central bank transparency

Autor: Christoph S. Weber
Rok vydání: 2019
Předmět:
Zdroj: Empirical Economics. 59:2947-2975
ISSN: 1435-8921
0377-7332
DOI: 10.1007/s00181-019-01741-1
Popis: Most central banks have increased their transparency in the recent past. The question is whether higher transparency comes at some cost. Firstly, the article shows in a theoretical model that transparency does not necessarily lead to higher unemployment. Secondly, the paper analyses the main theoretical results of other authors that transparency leads to higher wages and unemployment (volatility). The empirical results show no evidence for these conjectures. In fact, the analyses show that transparency can reduce the detrimental effect that central bank independence has on employment. Furthermore, the estimations confirm that transparency does not lead to higher unemployment volatility.
Databáze: OpenAIRE