The unemployment effect of central bank transparency
Autor: | Christoph S. Weber |
---|---|
Rok vydání: | 2019 |
Předmět: |
Statistics and Probability
Economics and Econometrics Labour economics Transparency (market) media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Monetary economics Mathematics (miscellaneous) Central bank 0502 economics and business Unemployment Economics 050207 economics Volatility (finance) Social Sciences (miscellaneous) 050205 econometrics media_common |
Zdroj: | Empirical Economics. 59:2947-2975 |
ISSN: | 1435-8921 0377-7332 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00181-019-01741-1 |
Popis: | Most central banks have increased their transparency in the recent past. The question is whether higher transparency comes at some cost. Firstly, the article shows in a theoretical model that transparency does not necessarily lead to higher unemployment. Secondly, the paper analyses the main theoretical results of other authors that transparency leads to higher wages and unemployment (volatility). The empirical results show no evidence for these conjectures. In fact, the analyses show that transparency can reduce the detrimental effect that central bank independence has on employment. Furthermore, the estimations confirm that transparency does not lead to higher unemployment volatility. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
Externí odkaz: |