| Popis: |
Why do autocratic leaders use referendums to amend a constitution, and what is the purpose of these amendments? While illiberal tendencies or outright autocratic goals are rationally understandable and have received widespread attention, little is known about constitutional referendums as a tool to pursue these goals. A constitutional referendum puts the question about a decrease of parliamentary oversight or institutional accountability to the people. If successful, the autocratic leader turns a plebiscite into the servant of autocratization. This poses an interesting theoretical and empirical puzzle. This contribution explores this puzzle and suggests that constitutional features and the organization of the party system, in particular the level of hegemonic party domination, condition the conscious use of direct public involvement in constitutional design and change. Through a comparative analysis of all constitutional referendums in the autocratic Post-Soviet countries until 2017 and two case studies of Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, it can be shown that autocrats use this instrument to extend the survival of the ruling nomenklatura, to entrench social or cultural values and to preserve the hegemonic status quo. |
