Acquiring Failed Banks

Autor: Siddharth Vij
Rok vydání: 2018
Předmět:
Zdroj: SSRN Electronic Journal.
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3234435
Popis: I study the relative importance of lending and deposit-taking for bank value. Comparing outcomes for winning banks to runner-up bidders in failed bank auctions, I find winners experience a 1.5% abnormal return and this increase is mainly due to deposits, not loans. After acquisition, the winning bank cuts lending to the failed bank's borrowers and closes branches but it retains almost all acquired deposits. These deposits are not channeled into lending elsewhere. Rather, the acquirer is able to lower deposit rates, reflecting increased market power. Multiple results are independent of the failed bank, suggesting the findings have broader relevance.
Databáze: OpenAIRE