The real effects of proxy advisors on the firm
| Autor: | Paul Calluzzo, Evan Dudley |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
050208 finance business.industry media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Accounting Shareholder value Incentive Shareholder Voting 0502 economics and business Value (economics) 050207 economics business Proxy (statistics) Proxy voting Private information retrieval Finance media_common |
| Zdroj: | Financial Management. 48:917-943 |
| ISSN: | 1755-053X 0046-3892 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/fima.12251 |
| Popis: | This paper examines the influence of proxy advisors (PA) on firm voting outcomes, policies, and value. We measure PA influence with shareholders' historical propensity to follow PA recommendations. PA influence increases the impact of PA recommendations on proxy voting outcomes and firm policies. When shareholders have private incentives to engage in costly research in the absence of a proxy advisor, PA influence neither harms nor benefits shareholder value. However, at firms with dispersed shareholders PA influence can increase value. Our findings are consistent with theories of voting in which proxy advisors compete with private information acquisition efforts by large shareholders. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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