Reasons as Reasons for Preferences
| Autor: | R.A. Rowland |
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| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | American Philosophical Quarterly. 59:297-311 |
| ISSN: | 2152-1123 0003-0481 |
| DOI: | 10.5406/21521123.59.3.07 |
| Popis: | I argue that all reasons for actions and attitudes consist in reasons for preferences; call this view RP. According to RP, reasons for A to believe that p just consist in reasons for A to prefer their believing that p to their not believing that p, and reasons for A to have a pro-attitude or perform an action just consist in reasons for A to prefer that she has that attitude/performs that action. I argue that we have strong reason to accept RP because we can explain a correlation between reasons for preferences and other reasons only if we accept RP. I argue that no objections undermine RP and that RP has interesting implications for the reasons for attitudes there are and for reasons fundamentalism. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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