| Popis: |
This chapter addresses the sort of objectivity which is characteristic of realism. More particularly, this chapter concerns how to distinguish between truths that say how objective reality is in itself, quite independently of us, and truths that do not. A form of conciliatory irrealism holds that there are truths of the form 'there are Fs' even though there are no Fs in reality; so, for instance, a moral irrealist of this sort might admit the existence of moral truths while denying that there are any moral facts in reality as it is in itself. This doctrine is difficult and obscure. Surprisingly, the theory of grounding turns out to be useful in understanding the idea. A ground-theoretic articulation of conciliatory irrealism is offered and its adequacy is discussed. In particular, a battery of characteristic commitments of conciliatory irrealism is described and used to develop ground-theoretic methods for assessing the irrealist's claims. |
