Bias? Who is Bias? Comments to Dellsén
Autor: | Juan J. Colomina-Almiñana |
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Rok vydání: | 2021 |
Předmět: |
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of science 05 social sciences 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Scientific theory 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Philosophy of language Philosophy 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Psychology Objectivity (science) Positivism |
Zdroj: | Philosophia. 50:35-42 |
ISSN: | 1574-9274 0048-3893 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11406-021-00366-y |
Popis: | (Dellsen, Philosophical Studies, 177(12), 3661–3678, 2020) argues that a positivistic defense of science’s objectivity is incoherent because bias in the generation of scientific theories (implies that the rational evaluation of theories will also be biased. Even though this is an idea easy to agree with, this approach is flawed for two different but related reasons. First, Dellsen’s notion of bias does not account for many ordinary biases. Second, Dellsen’s use of bias at the community-level is inconsistent. It shifts from individual scientists generating new theories and making decisions to scientific communities evaluating and accepting what theories are valid. This article offers a stronger response than Dellsen’s about aseptic objectivity in science by providing a more adequate account of bias, where psychological and behavioral aspects of individual scientists and community-level scientific practices are considered. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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