Quality‐improving R&D and merger policy in a differentiated duopoly: Cournot and Bertrand equilibria

Autor:	Nobuyuki Takashima, Yasunori Ouchida
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	Strategy and Management media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Product differentiation Management Science and Operations Research Cournot competition Investment (macroeconomics) Microeconomics Competition (economics) Spillover effect Management of Technology and Innovation 0502 economics and business Economics Quality (business) Product (category theory) 050207 economics Business and International Management Duopoly 050203 business & management media_common
Zdroj:	Managerial and Decision Economics. 41:1338-1348
ISSN:	1099-1468 0143-6570
DOI:	10.1002/mde.3179
Popis:	We combine a model of product research and development (R&D) and technological spillover with the concept of technological distance and examine horizontal mergers in a duopolistic market with R&D. The results are fourfold. First, a merger can better encourage R&D investment than the competition case. Second, with a small degree of product differentiation (PD), the merger criterion under the Cournot duopoly is stricter than that of the Bertrand case. By contrast, with a moderate or large degree of PD, the opposite is true. Third, with a small technological distance, a merger should be allowable. Finally, with a small degree of PD and moderate technological distance, a merger should be allowable.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::63db334737c35e887ca09de3e5933e57 https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3179 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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