Invariances in transformational emergence
| Autor: | Paul Humphreys |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Philosophy of science
Essentialism media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences General Social Sciences Metaphysics Context (language use) 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Philosophy of language Philosophy Laws of science Argument Identity (philosophy) 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Sociology media_common |
| Zdroj: | Synthese. 199:2745-2756 |
| ISSN: | 1573-0964 0039-7857 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11229-020-02909-4 |
| Popis: | This paper examines some possibilities for the laws of nature changing over time. This is done within the context of recent literature on transformational emergence. Transformational emergence is a diachronic account of emergence that does not require the invariance of fundamental objects, properties, and laws. The requirement that no new laws are introduced after the first instance of the universe seems to indicate that all the laws of the universe are present from the outset. By using a dispositional approach to fundamental properties, this restriction can be avoided. An argument appealing to quantitative laws of nature is then used to show that such laws are not, contrary to dispositional essentialism, metaphysically necessary. Further arguments are given to support the possibility of change of laws across time rather than across worlds and why the identity conditions for properties are different in the two cases. The paper is framed by an analysis of John Stuart Mill’s reasons for imposing the invariance requirement on fundamental laws. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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