Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions

Autor:	Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer
Rok vydání:	2004
Předmět:	Combinatorial auction Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Economics and Econometrics Mathematical optimization Economics Characterization (mathematics) Mathematical economics Finance
Zdroj:	Games and Economic Behavior. 47:87-103
ISSN:	0899-8256
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2003.04.001
Popis:	We prove that when the number of (potential) buyers is at least three, every ex post equilibrium in the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves combinatorial auction mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium and is symmetric. This complements a theorem proved by Holzman, Kfir-Dahav, Monderer, and Tennenholtz (2003), according to which, the symmetric bundling equilibria are precisely those defined by a quasi-field.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6213eb48a55cd3a9acda314a330c4cea https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.04.001 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full Text from ScienceDirect