International experiment on sanctions and cooperation to avert collective risk v1

Autor: Gianluca Grimalda, Alexis Belianin, not provided Heike Hennig-Schmidt, not provided Till Requate, not provided Marina V Ryzhkova
Rok vydání: 2021
Předmět:
Popis: We report the protocol relative to the experimental project "Sanctions and international interaction improve cooperation to avert climate change", which connected through the internet pairs of laboratories from Kiel and Bonn (Germany) and Moscow and Tomsk (Russia). The connection was realized through Z-Tree. Each research session comprised 24 participants, who were randomly allocated to four groups, whose members were three from one laboratory and three from the other. After receiving instructions and passing a comprehension test, participants interacted over ten rounds. Each participant had a fixed allocation of money in each round, which could have been kept for oneself or contributed to a group account. Contributions decreased the probability that every group member would suffer a 75% loss in their personal account at the end of the interaction. A random draw determined whether the loss event occurred, and individual payoffs were paid privately in cash at the end of the session. Each session was run under one of eight treatments, where (a) the group partners were either from the same country or from different countries, (b) information on the other group's nationality was either revealed or not, (c) sanctioning others in the group was either possible or not.
Databáze: OpenAIRE