What Motivates Bank Takeovers: An Insider's View

Autor:	Claudio Doria, Alessio De Vincenzo, Carmelo Salleo
Rok vydání:	2005
Předmět:	Corporate governance Ceteris paribus Value (economics) Agency (sociology) Diversification (finance) Market power Business Monetary economics Insider Economies of scale
Zdroj:	SSRN Electronic Journal.
ISSN:	1556-5068
DOI:	10.2139/ssrn.676688
Popis:	Bank takeovers result on average in little improvements in performance. This may be due to conflicting driving forces behind them; however these have seldom been studied. We study directly the motivations for bank acquisitions by analyzing the prices paid for them, under the assumption that bankers are willing to pay for what they want. We find that there is no evidence that bankers are ready to pay for possible economies of scale and scope; on the other hand buyers expect to transfer their superior managerial skills to targets. Market power seems to hold little value while entry (or diversification) commands a premium. Agency issues at the buyer are also an important motivation for takeovers: other things being equal more entrenched CEOs are willing to pay more; so are acquirers with more free capital.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::60d91020a11c0f079538393806013fc9 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.676688 Zobrazit plný text záznamu