Two-agent interactive implementation
| Autor: | Shuichi Tsugawa |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Review of Economic Design. 25:251-266 |
| ISSN: | 1434-4750 1434-4742 |
| Popis: | This study investigates the implementation of social choice rules (SCRs) in a situation where a planner not only designs the mechanism, but also participates as a player. This type of implementation is called interactive implementation. Using the same setting as Baliga and Sjostrom (Games Econ Behav 27(1):38–63, 1999) with the exception of the number of agents, I characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for two-agent interactive implementation, and find a necessary and sufficient condition, which we term intersection property. Even though our example shows the benefits of two-agent interactive implementation, that is, interactive implementation makes it possible to implement a non Maskin monotonic SCR, we find that it is not possible to implement a utilitarian planner’s optimum in a two-agent exchange economy and to resolve King Solomon’s dilemma. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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