| Popis: |
This chapter explores how classic democratic theory and principles, if non-arbitrarily interpreted, support the claim that sentient non-human animals have a right to be considered by the democratic state, and accordingly, develops the so-called interspecies democratic theory. The chapter first discusses three possible arguments against enfranchising animals in democracies, and whether they are convincing enough for an a priori dismissal of the case for political animal rights. Subsequently, it is argued that non-human animals are not political agents, which means that they cannot meaningfully engage in political activities themselves. However, it would be inaccurate to deduce from this mere fact that animals have no political rights at all. It is argued that sentient animals have a political right to have their interests considered by the state: the consideration right. This claim rests on the centrality of interests in a democracy, and as such is underpinned by several classic democratic principles which focus on interests. It follows from this chapter that sentient non-human animals on the territory of a democratic state have a right to have their interests considered in the decision-making processes of that democratic state. |
