Economic Reasons for the Nonhindrance of Creditors Per Se Rule? A Reply

Autor:	Sergio A. Muro
Rok vydání:	2007
Předmět:	Finance Insolvency business.industry Creditor Equity (finance) Shareholder loan Corporation Shareholder Bankruptcy Political Science and International Relations Fraudulent conveyance Economics Business and International Management business Law Law and economics
Zdroj:	European Business Organization Law Review. 8:401-411
ISSN:	1741-6205 1566-7529
DOI:	10.1017/s1566752907004016
Popis:	This paper examines a recently proposed per se rule to automatically treat as equity secured loans granted by shareholders to the corporation on the eve of insolvency. It shows that arguments based on the dual quality of the lendershareholder are insufficient by themselves to propose such a rigid rule, which would curb potentially socially beneficial loans. Further empirical research is needed to shed light on this issue.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5eb12a13925a0d3bb2caf71af6095581 https://doi.org/10.1017/s1566752907004016 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink