Confirmation Wars, Legislative Time, and Collateral Damage
| Autor: | Richard L. Vining, James E. Monogan, Anthony J. Madonna |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
021110 strategic
defence & security studies Battle Sociology and Political Science Presidential system media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies Legislature 02 engineering and technology 0506 political science Test (assessment) Supreme court Political science Law 050602 political science & public administration Collateral damage Nomination media_common |
| Zdroj: | Political Research Quarterly. 69:746-759 |
| ISSN: | 1938-274X 1065-9129 |
| DOI: | 10.1177/1065912916658128 |
| Popis: | Presidents often see a Supreme Court nomination as an opportunity to leave a lasting mark on policy. Recent studies speculate that focusing on Supreme Court nominees affects presidential success beyond the confirmation process, but this has not been established systematically. We develop and test a hypothesis stating that presidents who get into a battle to promote a controversial Supreme Court nominee will see delays and failures in their efforts to promote their legislative agenda in the Senate and fill lower level judicial vacancies. We test our theory using data on presidential policy agenda items from 1967 to 2010 and lower level judicial nominations from 1977 to 2010. We find that increased efforts in promoting confirmation reduce the likelihood of timely Senate approval of important policy proposals and nominees to federal district courts. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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