Explaining variation in coalition agreements: The electoral and policy motivations for drafting agreements
| Autor: | Jason Eichorst |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Předmět: |
Sociology and Political Science
business.industry media_common.quotation_subject MathematicsofComputing_GENERAL TheoryofComputation_GENERAL computer.file_format Commit Public administration Negotiation Empirical research Work (electrical) Dominance (economics) Argument Cabinet (file format) Economics business computer Publication Law and economics media_common |
| Zdroj: | European Journal of Political Research. 53:98-115 |
| ISSN: | 0304-4130 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/1475-6765.12026 |
| Popis: | This article explores the question of why coalition partners negotiate and publish coalition agreements before entering into a cabinet and why the content of these agreements varies so widely. Some scholars suggest that coalition partners draft agreements for electoral purposes, while others suggest that coalition agreements can be used to commit to policy negotiations. Although both sides of the debate have uncovered supportive evidence, the literature remains in disagreement. This article provides new organisation of previous work on agreements and develops two alternative theoretical arguments about the crafting of coalition agreements. It is argued here that coalition partners consider both electoral and policy motivations during the drafting of agreements and that the dominance of one of these motivations is conditional on the degree of issue saliency and division between partners. Empirical support is found for the theoretical argument that coalition partners include low saliency issues in the coalition agreement on policy dimensions on which they are less divided, and that coalition partners include high saliency issues in the coalition agreement on policy dimensions on which they are more divided. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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