| Popis: |
In this dissertation, I seek to answer the following questions in relation to party strength and redistricting: (1) how can we better measure sources of party organizational strength over time; (2) how do the three legs of the tripartite structure reinforce each other (3) why do some state legislatures lose their power to redistrict; and (4) how can districts be drawn to influence who runs successfully for higher office. First, I offer two new measures of party strength, one for organizations and one for party competition. These new measures, the weighted funds party campaign committees have on hand and the marginal majority measurement (MMM) provide improved measures of party stability and capacity over time. I then demonstrate in regards to the second question that while increased competition can strengthen party organizations, increased polarization can displace organizational strength. Third, I posit that redistricting is a collective action problem, with too many self interested legislators amidst a complex technical issue. Only though decreasing the time necessary to deliberate and avoid common redistricting pitfalls via strong party leadership can the state legislature hold onto redistricting authority. Finally, I argue that whether a legislator runs for office is very dependent upon where districts are drawn, as legislators can carry over their incumbency advantage via shared constituencies between multiple levels of districts. To support these chapters, I employ time series and multistage survival modeling of party committee funds, body in charge of redistricting, and when legislators run for higher office given district overlap. |
