A Defense Mechanism for Timing-based Side-Channel Attacks on IoT Traffic
| Autor: | Andressa Vergutz, Nelson G. Prates, Ricardo Tombesi Macedo, Aldri Santos, Michele Nogueira |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Computer science
Mechanism (biology) business.industry Vulnerability 020206 networking & telecommunications 02 engineering and technology Computer security computer.software_genre 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing Side channel attack Internet of Things business computer |
| Zdroj: | GLOBECOM |
| DOI: | 10.1109/globecom42002.2020.9322070 |
| Popis: | This work proposes FISHER: a deFense mechanIsm against timing-based Side-channel attack related to response time on the intERnet of things (IoT). IoT connects objects that support important applications, such as electronic health, smart homes, and Industry 4.0. However, timing-based side-channel attacks on IoT network traffic compromise user privacy. Related works present a limited view of side-channel leakages and as a solution, these works try to mask them. However, they ignore that devices have unique behaviors that intensify the problem of privacy leaks through response time. Hence, FISHER follows two modules: (i) vulnerability test and (ii) privacy protection. The vulnerability test module identifies timing-based side-channel leakages and reveals new vulnerabilities associated with the response time. The privacy protection module implements two methods that mask the identified time-based leakages on the network traffic. Results from an experimental scenario show that FISHER identifies precisely the side-channel leakages related to response time and efficiently masks them. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|