Stackelberg and Nash Equilibria in Games with Linear-Quadratic Payoff Functions as Models of Public Goods

Autor:	Victor Gorelik, Tatiana Zolotova
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory symbols.namesake Nash equilibrium Quadratic form Stochastic game symbols Stackelberg competition Function (mathematics) Public good Robustness (economics) Mathematical economics Convolution Mathematics
Zdroj:	Optimization and Applications ISBN: 9783030910587 OPTIMA
DOI:	10.1007/978-3-030-91059-4_20
Popis:	The paper proposes a game model with an additive convolution of two criteria, describing public and personal interests. The first (general) criterion depends on strategies of all players and represents losses from the intensity of their activity. The second (particular) criterion for each player is a function of his strategy and reflects the income from his activities. The negative definite quadratic form is taken as a general criterion. The particular criterion of each player is linear, which is quite natural for the formalization of the income function. It turns out that the resulting game with linear-quadratic payoff functions has good properties, in particular, the independence of the leader’s strategy in the Stackelberg equilibrium from the parameters of the follower’s linear functions (in contrast to the Nash equilibrium). This property means that the leader does not need accurate information about the follower’s objective function, and his strategy has the property of robustness.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::582936673d5979df928ff20fa76b8837 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91059-4_20 Zobrazit plný text záznamu