| Popis: |
There is now a large literature on values in science, discussing whether andhow science can be objective while realistically acknowledging andmanaging the impact of values in the production of scientific information.In this paper, I am concerned with what counts as a value in this literature.Although previous discussions have identified a great many locationswhere value judgements occur, and a great many kinds of “inductive risk”,they have nevertheless focused on a particular kind of evaluation. I callthese evaluations of concrete outcomes. I argue that philosophersinterested in values and science ought to additionally consider scientists’attitudes to uncertainty, which are evaluations of decision situations ratherthan concrete outcomes. I will be concerned with inductive risk, and theclaim I make is a conditional one: if you are concerned about inductive riskin a particular part of science, then that concern should include uncertaintyattitudes alongside the more commonly considered moral, social, orpolitical values. |
