CEO Domination, Growth Opportunities, and their Impact on Audit Fees

Autor:	Bikki Jaggi, Ferdinand A. Gul, Judy S. L. Tsui
Rok vydání:	2001
Předmět:	Finance 050208 finance business.industry 05 social sciences Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) Chief audit executive Accounting Audit Negative association Audit risk Internal audit Joint audit 0502 economics and business Business 050207 economics Chief executive officer
Zdroj:	Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance. 16:189-208
ISSN:	2160-4061 0148-558X
Popis:	This study examines the relationship between a firm's internal monitoring mechanism and its impact on the audit fee. The first hypothesis investigates whether firms with independent corporate boards (chief executive officer and chairman being separate individuals) provide a more effective internal monitoring mechanism and are thus associated with lower control risk, resulting in lower audit effort and fees as compared to nonindependent, CEO-dominated boards. The second hypothesis examines whether the effectiveness of the internal monitoring mechanism provided by independent corporate boards is independent of the firms' growth opportunities. High-growth firms are by nature more difficult to monitor due to the existence of discretionary investments and measurement problems associated with future assets. Thus, the negative association between independent corporate boards and audit fees is expected to be affected by a firm's growth. Results using 650 observations from Hong Kong companies provide support for both hypotheses.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5662fd78c350f8685ed5abb6c825241b https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558x0101600303 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF