Banking Panics as Endogenous Disasters and the Welfare Gains from Macroprudential Policy

Autor:	Andrea Prestipino, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Mark Gertler
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	Macroeconomic model Leverage (finance) media_common.quotation_subject Economics General Medicine Monetary economics Boom Welfare media_common
Zdroj:	AEA Papers and Proceedings. 110:463-469
ISSN:	2574-0776 2574-0768
DOI:	10.1257/pandp.20201022
Popis:	We study the welfare effects of macroprudential policy in a macroeconomic model of banking instability. Banking panics are endogenous economic disasters caused by banks' excessive leverage during credit booms. The model matches the frequency and severity of banking panics and the statistical relationship between panics and credit booms. A simple countercyclical macroprudential rule can achieve non-negligible welfare gains. These gains rise substantially when the run probability increases during a credit boom and, ex post, if a run is actually avoided. In a model without panics in which financial crises are driven by fundamentals only, the gains are much more limited.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::557df098a3d816d04c515b38ed3e4b63 https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20201022 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF