Pragmatism and Correspondence
| Autor: | Andrew Howat |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Philosophy of mind
Pragmatism Philosophy of science media_common.quotation_subject Philosophy 05 social sciences Metaphysics 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Direct and indirect realism 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Truism Philosophy of language 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Realism media_common |
| Zdroj: | Philosophia. 49:685-704 |
| ISSN: | 1574-9274 0048-3893 |
| Popis: | It is commonplace to describe the pragmatist conception of truth (PT) as incompatible with correspondence theory. This popular description relies on a deflationary reading of Peirce and James’s many apparent endorsements of correspondence. This reading says they regarded it as a mere platitude or truism, not as a substantive piece of philosophical theorizing. There are two main reasons typically offered in support of this platitude narrative – (1) its consonance with Peirce’s original formulation of PT from 1878, and (2) the objections that pragmatists (including Peirce himself) frequently raised against various notions traditionally associated with CT (e.g. metaphysical realism, representationalism, etc.). I argue that neither reason is compelling and that PT and CT are compatible conceptions of truth. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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