| Autor: |
Yang Yang, Fu Weiqiong, Tian Gang |
| Rok vydání: |
2011 |
| Předmět: |
|
| Zdroj: |
2011 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government (ICEE). |
| DOI: |
10.1109/icebeg.2011.5886937 |
| Popis: |
Retailers and suppliers in the supply chain channel are competitive and cooperative. Retailers' marginal cost is private information. Based on the purpose of maximizing their own interests, retailers are bound to conceal this part of information and cause information asymmetry between suppliers and retailers which reduces the supply chain benefits. In the case of asymmetric information, establishing demands depends on the revenue sharing contract coordination model of price in order to gain the optimal order quantity of supply chain and the best benefits and to realize the coordination of the supply chain. Through simulative analysis, it's proved that revenue sharing contract can improve the supply chain and the members' profit level to achieve the purpose of supply chain coordination. |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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