| Popis: |
One of the arguments often put forward in Israel in favor of enacting a constitutional override clause, which would allow a majority of the Knesset members to reenact legislation struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional, is that, in comparative terms, the Israeli Supreme Court is a very activist court, and that invalidating legislation is part of its activist bent. The proponents of the override clause present it as a necessary reaction to the disruption of the balance of power between the different branches of government caused by the Supreme Court’s activism. In this Article we refute one central part of the argument made by proponents of the override clause. As we show, the Supreme Court of Israel does not invalidate legislation at a rate higher than featured by comparable courts in the world. To the contrary, its rate of invalidation is lower than that of some comparable apex courts. Furthermore, the rate of invalidating legislation has actually declined in recent years, if measured against the sharp increase in the number of petitions submitted to the Court urging it to invalidate legislation. This suggests that contrary to what is often alleged in the political discourse in Israel, the Court is becoming more and more cautious in applying its powers of constitutional review. |
