Naive Realism for Unconscious Perceptions
| Autor: | Ori Beck |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Unconscious mind
Logic media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 06 humanities and the arts 050905 science studies 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Epistemology Philosophy Character (mathematics) Perception 060302 philosophy Ontology 0509 other social sciences Psychology Naïve realism media_common |
| Zdroj: | Erkenntnis. 87:1175-1190 |
| ISSN: | 1572-8420 0165-0106 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10670-020-00236-1 |
| Popis: | Unconscious perceptions (i.e., person-level perceptions that lack phenomenal character) have recently become a focal point in the debate for and against naive realism. In this paper I defend the naive realist side. More specifically, I use an idea of Martin’s to develop a new version of naive realism—neuro-computational naive realism. I argue that neuro-computational naive realism offers a uniform treatment of both conscious and unconscious perceptions. I also argue that it accommodates the possibility of phenomenally different conscious perceptions of the same items, and that it can answer a further challenge to naive realism raised by Berger and Nanay. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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