Joining a Monetary Union: Stabilisation Costs Versus Stabilisation Bias

Autor:	Marcelo Sánchez
Rok vydání:	2011
Předmět:	Macroeconomics Currency union Inflation targeting Monetary policy Business cycle Economics Monetary economics Price of stability Robustness (economics) General Economics Econometrics and Finance Monetary hegemony Monetary base
Zdroj:	Journal of Economic Integration. 26:66-80
ISSN:	1976-5525 1225-651X
Popis:	Currency union participation may create a welfare tradeoff relating to monetary factors. Stabilisation costs arise from asymmetric shocks across the union. Countries pursuing discretionary national monetary policies benefit from a committed common central bank, which eliminates Svensson’s(1997) stabilisation bias. Currency union membership is favoured by greater price stability focus and commitment of the common central bank, nominal flexibility, and business cycle synchronisation. Monetary union stabilisation performance also improves with lower variability and persistence of cost-push shocks – the latter feature being detectable only for persistence. The degree of monetary policy robustness to parameter uncertainty has somewhat less clear-cut implications.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4b44ed2de97730190b3f8e779c6fd245 https://doi.org/10.11130/jei.2011.26.1.66 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF