Three revenue-sharing variants: their significant performance differences under system-parameter uncertainties
| Autor: | Yung-Yun Wang, Zhongsheng Hua, Hon-Shiang Lau |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Předmět: |
Marketing
Mathematical optimization 021103 operations research Operations research Perfect power Revenue sharing business.industry Strategy and Management 0211 other engineering and technologies 02 engineering and technology Management Science and Operations Research Purchasing Profit (economics) Management Information Systems Gross profit 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Economics Information system Revenue 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing Project management business |
| Zdroj: | Journal of the Operational Research Society. 63:1752-1764 |
| ISSN: | 1476-9360 0160-5682 |
| DOI: | 10.1057/jors.2011.131 |
| Popis: | In the widely studied ‘revenue sharing’ (hereafter [RS]) contract format, the manufacturer of a product not only charges the retailer a unit wholesale price w, but also requires the retailer to share part of the product's revenue (ie, the unit retail price p) with him. For a product with price-dependent demand, it is well known that if a dominant manufacturer knows the system parameters deterministically, then [RS] gives him the perfect power of simultaneously coordinating the channel and allocating profit arbitrarily. Unfortunately, [RS]'s power deteriorates as the manufacturer's knowledge of the system parameters becomes increasingly uncertain. This paper shows that this deterioration can be substantially reduced by using slightly modified versions of [RS]; these modifications roughly amount to sharing a retailer's gross profit instead of revenue. In other words, this paper presents simple modifications to the classical [RS], leading to contract formats that perform substantially better under system-parameter uncertainty. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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